In this paper, we study the e ect of a firm's local channel exits on prices charged by incumbents remaining in the marketplace. Exits could result in higher prices due to tempered competition or lower prices due to reduced co-location or agglomeration benefits. The net e ect of these two countervailing forces remains unknown. In addition, little is known about how this e ect could change depending on incumbents' geographic locations. We address this research gap by examining new car price reactions by incumbent multi-product automobile dealerships who experience the exit of a Chrysler dealership in their local markets. We find evidence that the competition e ect exceeds the co-location e ect: prices increase by about 1% ($318) following an exit relative to the price change in the absence of an exit. Importantly, we find that the price increase is lower at dealerships more proximate to the exiting dealership than dealerships farther away for the same set of cars available across these locations. This finding suggests di erences in the extent of the two forces (competition and agglomeration) at di erent distances from the closed dealership. We assess the generalizability of our results by looking at the impact of GM's closure of Pontiac dealerships. Taken together, our results inform consumers, firms, and policymakers about possible implications of an exit.
Introduction
In this paper, we seek to understand the impact of a firm's local channel exit on prices charged by the incumbents that continue to serve the market. When a firm exits the local market, intuition suggests that the decrease in the number of firms will lead to a less competitive market, and thus higher prices (the "market power" hypothesis). However, in markets where consumer search costs are important, firms co-locate with their rivals so as to lower consumer search costs (Rosenthal 1980; Samuelson and Zhang 1992) . In such a setting, exit by a proximate firm could lead to lower prices as the remaining firms need to compensate for the loss in co-location benefits (the "agglomeration" hypothesis). In the presence of these two opposing forces, ceteris paribus, the impact of an exit on prices of surviving incumbents is ambiguous.
Three broad literatures inform us about the price consequences of a change in the number of firms in a market. The literature on price-concentration and mergers (see Weiss 1989 or Newmark 2004 for a review of these studies) investigates the association between market concentration (measured by the number of firms) and prices. Relying on cross-sectional analyses (either at the market or firm level), early studies found that concentration is positively associated with prices, but the presence of unobserved demand and cost shocks could lead to severe biases in their estimated e ects of the number of firms on prices (Bresnahan 1989; Schmalensee 1989; Orhun 2012 ). More recently, using firm-or market-level panel data, researchers have been able to account for time-invariant unobservables, and have found no e ect of geographic concentration or mergers on retail prices (Davis 2005; Jiménez and Perdiguero 2014) . A potential limitation of these panel-data-based studies is that they rely on aggregate firm-level price indices or investigate industry settings where prices do not vary within a firm (Cotterill 1986; Manuszak and Moul 2008) . Therefore, it is unclear if the predictions from these studies hold in multi-product firms settings (such as those in the automobile industry we consider), where prices vary quite significantly within and across firms' product-lines.
The empirical entry literature also o ers inconclusive predictions on the impact of a new competitor on prices (e.g., Simon 2005; Basker and Noel 2009; Ailawadi et al. 2010; Singh et al. 2006; Gielens et al. 2008; Jia 2008; Singh and Zhu 2008; and Zhu et al. 2011) . While several studies have shown incumbent price reductions up to 3% with entry (Basker 2005; Hausman and Leibtag 2007; Basker and Noel 2009) , other studies find that no reaction is also common (Ailawadi et al. 2010 ). Yet, another set of studies finds a positive e ect of entry on prices (Thomas 1999; Yamawaki 2002) . At the same time, it is unclear whether the predictions from this literature translate directly to the case of exits (the focus of our study) due to inherent di erences between entering and exiting firms. For example, consumers with high habit persistence may not visit a new store that opens in their local market, but they will have to change their patronage if their favorite store closes (Rhee and Bell 2002) . With some notable exceptions, incumbent reactions to exits have received scant attention in the marketing and economics literature.
The studies by Joskow et al. (1994) and Daraban and Fournier (2008) (using market-quarter-level data) look at exits in the airline industry and show an increase in fares of around 10% following an exit. The magnitude of competitive reaction to exits in these airline-industry studies is much higher in absolute terms compared to the findings from entry studies in other industries (Basker 2005; Hausman and Leibtag 2007; Basker and Noel 2009) , suggesting that a change in the number of firms in a market could have a di erent e ect depending on whether the change is due to a market entry or exit. Since the exit analyses are conducted at the market level, consequences for individual firms/products are less clear. At the same time, predictions from the analysis of exits in the airline industry with little spatial di erentiation within a market may not directly translate to industries with potentially high levels of spatial di erentiation (e.g., automobile retailing).
A third literature stream, on agglomeration, suggests that firms co-locate to take advantage of heightened demand (e.g., Marshall 1920; Stahl 1982; Wernerfelt 1994; Vitorino 2012; Datta and Sudhir 2013) . Marshall (1920) makes the observation that consumers are willing to incur substantial investment of time and travel when buying high-priced products. Thus, he implicitly brings up the role of consumers' search costs in stores' decisions to cluster due to potential demand-side benefits. Stahl (1982) and Wernerfelt (1994) provided formal models that suggest search costs as a motivation for firm agglomeration. According to Stahl (1982) , a retailer might choose to locate close to its rivals if increased demand due to co-location (i.e., market area e ect) exceeds reduced demand due to substitution. If the retailer decides to join a cluster of competitors, under high consumer search costs due to imperfect information, that retailer will enhance the likelihood of visitation for the other retailers in that location. This positive externality is especially relevant when consumers have limited knowledge related to the characteristics of the products available in di erent locations. Wernerfelt (1994) , on the other hand, argues that, by locating close to each other, retailers might commit to a strategy that does not take advantage of consumers' initial investment. In other words, retailers can use co-location instead of price advertising especially when consumers need to inspect the product at the store before purchasing (e.g., consumer durables such as cars). This assertion could be more applicable for cars as dealers cannot advertise prices for every unit available for sale.
While scholars have examined the impact of these agglomeration benefits on firm entry decisions, their impact on product-level prices in the context of firm exits has not received much attention.
Taken together, these three streams of literature suggest that in many industries including automobile retailing, where both the competitive e ect and the agglomeration e ect are at work, extant research o ers limited to no guidance on how a firm's exit impacts incumbents' pricing decisions. On one hand, Davis (2005) shows that the price e ect of competition attenuates with distance in the motion picture industry. On the other hand, in their analysis of births of new establishments across six U.S industries, Rosenthal and Strange (2003) find that agglomeration externalities decline swiftly in the first couple of miles but more gradually after that. Unfortunately, how the net e ect changes with distance is not known.
In this paper, we seek to complement the above literatures in two ways. First, we investigate how incumbent firms' product-level pricing decisions respond (direction and magnitude) to a local competitor's exit. Second, since competitor exits can result in either gains (due to increased market power) or losses (due to decreased agglomeration benefits) to incumbent firms, and since these losses and gains can change with the distance from the exiting firm, we characterize di erential price responses as a function of the geographic distance between the exiting firm and the incumbent.
In order to accomplish these objectives, we compile a unique data set around an important and unprecedented event in the U.S. automobile retailing industry. In 2009, as part of the much publicized and debated Federal Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), also referred to as the "automobile industry bailout program," two of America's three car manufacturers, i.e., Chrysler and General Motors (GM), exercised their last-ditch option and filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy (Lafontaine and Morton 2010) . These were the first auto manufacturer bankruptcies in U.S. history.
The move gave Chrysler the freedom to immediately terminate 789 -or 25% -of its 3,181 dealerships in May 2009, which it completed in the June -July 2009 period (one dealership in our final data sample closed in August 2009). Such quick and large-scale changes are unparalleled in the U.S. auto industry, but also a ord new opportunities to research distribution-channel-related questions that were previously not addressable. While our main focus is on the exit of Chrysler dealerships, we assess the robustness of our results to the closure of GM's Pontiac dealerships as well.
Specifically, our data and approach provide the following advantages that alleviate the concerns raised in the context of the previous literature as discussed above. First, due to the extent of an unprecedented number of Chrysler and GM closings, we observe a large number of exits spanning numerous geographic markets. Second, our data consist of a comprehensive dealer-VIN-level monthly panel for new cars between October 2008 and September 2010. 1 Our unit of analysis is a "car" as defined by the 10-digit subset of its VIN that reflects most vehicle characteristics. 2 We seek to understand how the price of a "car" changes with the exit of a neighboring Chrysler dealership (relative to the price change in the absence of an exit). Thus, we try to mitigate the concerns related to the market-or firm-level analysis. Third, while the number of closed Chrysler dealerships varies across geographic markets, most Chrysler dealerships are terminated in a relatively short period (June-July 2009). So the exit variation in our setting is mainly cross-sectional. This, combined with the panel structure of the data, allows us to use dealer fixed e ects to take into account strategic selection (if any) of the terminated dealer as well as other dealer-specific unobservables. Finally, the automobile retailing industry provides an appropriate context to assess agglomeration-related benefits, as previous studies show that agglomeration e ects are particularly important in industries where product heterogeneity is high and consumers need to personally inspect goods (Fischer and Harrington 1996; Simon 2005) .
We find that retail prices on average increase by 1.006% ($318) following an exit, suggesting that the overall gains from tempered competition o set a reduction in agglomeration benefits (if any). To examine if both the "market-power hypothesis" and "agglomeration-benefits hypothesis" 1 A VIN is the abbreviation for a 17-digit vehicle identification number that is used to identify individual motor vehicles. As discussed later, we define a "car" as every combination of the digits 1-8 and 10-11 of VINs in order to capture information on most vehicle characteristics. The availability of data at this level allows us to control for factors such as manufacturer, make, model year, assembly plant, restraint system, body type, engine type, and transmission.
2 Although we refer to each unit as a "car," our products span all vehicle types, including convertibles, coupes, hatchbacks, minivans, sedans, SUVs, trucks and wagons, and all fuel types including gasoline, diesel, hybrid or electric.
are at work in our empirical context, we study how prices of cars vary across 3 distance bands -within 10 miles, between 10 and 20 miles, and between 20 and 30 miles. As there could be di erences in the cars available across these distance bands due to endogenous dealership locations, we use a subsample of our data including a set of car models that are available across all three distance bands. For this subsample, we find that the average price increase due to the exit of
Chrysler dealerships within 30 miles is $562. Cars located closest to the exiting dealer (within 10 miles) stand to gain the most from reduced competition, but also experience the most reduction in demand-side agglomeration benefits, compared to cars at less proximate dealers. As a result, prices of cars at proximate dealers rise by $265. In contrast, dealers that are located farther away from the exiting dealer (more than 10 miles) also face tempered competition and do so with limited to no erosion in agglomeration benefits. This a ords distant dealers more room to raise prices following an exit. For example, cars located at dealers within 10-20 miles (20-30 miles) raise prices on average by $1,034 ($780) following a Chrysler dealer exit. Since agglomeration benefits erode much faster than gains from tempered competition, proximate dealers have a lower ability to raise prices than extremely distant ones ($265 versus $780).
These results have several implications for consumers, firms, and policymakers. For consumers, our results suggest that if search costs are such that shopping is restricted to the geographic area where the exit occurs, then going to a dealership closest to the exited dealership will likely yield the lowest price due to the biggest loss in agglomeration benefits for the nearest dealerships. From the firm perspective, our results have di erent implications for product categories in which search costs may or may not play a role in consumers' shopping behaviors. In the presence of search costs, we show that firms need to consider the tradeo s between competitive and agglomeration e ects when locating retail outlets. Since the exits in our setting were only realized by forced bankruptcy protection, our findings have direct and immediate appeal to policymakers. First, our findings inform them on the extent to which prices change as a consequence of the closures. This has potential implications for consumer welfare and calls for a more complete analysis of the demand and pricing consequences of the exits. Our findings also inform policymakers of the potential consequences of relaxing franchise laws if such laws lead to closure of additional dealerships. A third implication has to do with evaluating the consequences of mergers in such markets. If mergers lead to fewer dealerships, then policymakers need to evaluate not just the competitive e ects of these mergers, but also the consequences for consumers in terms of potentially increasing search costs due to lower distribution intensity. The automotive industry is an important contributor to the U.S. economy. U.S. auto dealers (new and used car dealerships) account for 7.9% of total retail employment, directly providing jobs for an estimated 1.2 million American workers. 4 Given its economic significance and rich institutional features, the automobile industry has had natural appeal to marketing and management scholars.
Academic research examining this industry has generated rich insights around pricing (Bresnahan 1981; Berry et al. 1995; Sudhir 2001) , consumer-directed price promotions (Bruce et al. 2006) , trade promotions (Bruce et al. 2005) , buyer-supplier links (Martin et al. 1995) , channel pass-through (Busse et al. 2006) , information search (Punj and Staelin 1983) , leasing versus selling Purohit 1998, 1999) , new versus used-car competition (Purohit 1992) , consumer-adoption decisions (Schiraldi 2011) , dealer-consumer negotiations (Desai and Purohit 2004) , product obsolescence (Levinthal and Purohit 1989) , and hybrid-car adoption (Gallagher and Muehlegger 2011 
Data
The data we analyze come from three sources. We complement this primary data set by collecting information on the identities of dealerships slated for closure using the bankruptcy filings and press releases of Chrysler and GM. This second data set includes the name, address, and majority owner of each of the closed dealers as well as the franchises (i.e., brands) carried by each of them. 6 Using the addresses of the dealers in our two data sets, we generate precise latitude and longitude coordinates. Then we compute the distance in miles from each dealer's location to each of the closed Chrysler and GM dealers. Accordingly, we calculate the number of closings within di erent distance bands (i.e., 0-10 miles, 10-20 miles, and 20-30 miles). Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for the key variables used in the estimation procedures as well as the observed car categories in our data set.
Finally, in order to control for the demographic characteristics (e.g., median household income and population) of local markets, we collected ZIP-code-level demographic information that varies annually from SimplyMap database (http:// geographicresearch.com/simplymap).
6 A comparison of exit and non-exit dealers of Chrysler across various observable characteristics is provided in Online Appendix 1.
Car Definition and Selection
We define a "car" as every combination of the digits 1-8 and 10-11 of VINs. For instance, for a given VIN=1FDBP05FXBA100001, our "car" ID is 1FDBP05FBA. The reason for using these digits for defining cars is that each VIN is composed of several sections. 
Retail Market Definition
We use a fixed mileage (i.e., 30 miles) distance radius to define the local retail markets (see, for example, Ailawadi et al. 2010 and Davis 2005 for a similar approach). In other words, a specific dealer is assumed to be "treated" by a local market exit if there is a closed dealer within its retail market. This definition aims at capturing the e ect of market exits on dealers that are directly competing with closed dealers. 7 We do not expect significant changes to our results if we enlarge the retail market coverage because Albuquerque and Bronnenberg (2012) show that the e ect of distance from dealers on consumer utility is marginally decreasing. In other words, most of the utility reduction happens within short distances. Thus, they find that cross-price elasticities are negligible when the distance between two dealers is more than 30 miles. While we use the 30-mile radius to define the market, as we note above, we look for di erences across various distance bands, for a fixed set of car models, within that radius to look at agglomeration versus competition e ects.
7 We later conduct a more detailed analysis by breaking up the local market into three distance bands.
Based on the above mentioned local market definition, we eliminate dealers that are within the local market of: i) an inconsistently observed closed Chrysler dealer, ii) a consistently observed closed Chrysler dealer that switches to another brand after the closing, and iii) a GM dealer that has been slated for closure. In addition, some of the closed Chrysler dealerships continued to carry other brands (e.g., Toyota). Although these dealerships appear as incumbent dealerships, they cannot be designated as rivals to the closed Chrysler dealerships. As our analysis focuses on rival responses, we excluded such dealerships from our analysis. higher income levels, greater white population share, and higher numbers of local competitors.
8 A comparison of the dealerships we finally included in our sample and those we dropped from our sample [because they met conditions (i) through (iii)] is provided in Online Appendix 1. The di erence between included and dropped dealers is not economically and statistically significant in terms of stability, number of vacant units, percent female population, or average prices. The di erence between the two groups is statistically significant but economically modest in terms of average household size, average number of makes, average number of models, and average number of categories. The dropped dealers are di erent from the included dealers in that they operate in more urban markets with higher populations, median household incomes and average number of cars sold. This is not unexpected, given the criteria we used to ensure clean identification. More precisely, we dropped dealers that are within the local market of: i) an inconsistently observed closed Chrysler dealer, ii) a consistently observed closed Chrysler dealer that switches to another brand after the closing, and iii) a GM dealer that has been slated for closure. Especially, the third criterion means that a ected dealers that are dropped experienced both Chrysler and GM closings in their market. In other words, these markets should have had more population to sustain both Chrysler and GM dealerships to start with compared to the markets where included dealers operate. 9 We report the p-values of the Wilcoxon two-sample test along with the t-test for group di erences because the box plots for the variables (provided in Online Appendix 1) exhibit outliers, thus casting doubt on the distributional assumption of the t-test.
Possibly as a result of being in markets with higher demand potentials, their monthly average sales are higher than those of control dealers. Using only the pre-closure period monthly time-series data, we regressed log prices at the car-month-dealer level on the treatment dummy (for all those dealerships that subsequently saw an exit) along with all the observables that we subsequently use in our analysis such as population and income at the ZIP-code level, number of local competitors, etc. and identified unobservable factors reflected in various fixed e ects (discussed later). Our recovered coe cient for the treatment dummy is not significant at the 10% significance level (pvalue of 0.37). This regression result supports the idea that the treatment and control group dealers are similar in the pre-treatment period after controlling for observables. 10
Another issue related to the comparability of treatment and control dealers is the similarity in terms of local market time trends. Our subsequent analysis explicitly accounts for such trends at the DMA (where the dealership is located) level via DMA-month fixed e ects. However, to assess whether more micro trends exist, we look at data for ZIP codes in which treatment and control group dealers are located. Specifically, we report the change in population, employment, household income, number of vacant units, and stability (% in current residence 5+ years) between 2008 and 2009 in Table 2 . The changes in these demographic variables, except for median household income, show no significant di erence between the two groups. Since the data show that household income increases more in ZIP codes where the treated dealers are located, an increase in price (if any) associated with cars at these dealerships could be explained by the concomitant increase in incomes. Consequently, in our subsequent analysis we (i) include this as a control variable, and (ii) include a dealer-specific time trend in the analysis. In addition, we look at changes in the number of gas stations and number of electronics and appliance stores in Table 2 to see if there is any di erential trend for businesses related to cars and durable goods. Again the comparison suggests that the local time trends are not significantly di erent between control and treatment groups. 11
10 We also provide several graphical analyses that show examples of treatment and control group similarity before treatment as well as di erential price changes between the two groups after the treatment in Online Appendix 2. 11 We thank an anonymous reviewer for his/her suggestion.
Empirical Framework and Identification Strategy
In this section, we assess the e ect of local market exits on retail prices. Specifically, we estimate the impact of the number of Chrysler dealer closings on the retail price of a given car (as defined previously). Our empirical strategy is closest in spirit to Ailawadi et al. (2010) , who examine the e ect of Wal-Mart entry on incumbent retailers' marketing mix reactions and sales outcomes.
Ideally, given a set of markets with Chrysler dealerships, if we could randomly assign a subset of markets to a "treatment" condition, i.e., the exit of the Chrysler dealership, and the remaining to a "control" condition, i.e., no dealer exit, we could then look at the "di erence-in-di erences"
for prices across the treatment and control groups before and after the Chrysler exit. As Chrysler likely chooses the treatment strategically rather than randomly, unobserved factors that are correlated with the decision to shut down a Chrysler dealership might also be correlated with, say, Toyota's prices; so a simple comparison of prices across rival dealers that do and do not face an exit may not su ce. Further, one might be concerned about exits that occur for reasons other than the bankruptcy filing. Two key institutional features help alleviate these concerns. First, unlike other industry settings where exits are permitted and frequently occurring, federal and state franchise regulations limit the ability of automobile manufacturers to terminate their franchised dealerships at will other than via Chapter 11 bankruptcy court protection (Lafontaine and Morton 2010) . Therefore, apart from the variation in dealer exits introduced by Chrysler's dealer network consolidation event, there is limited additional variation in dealer exits in our setting. 12 Second, while the number of terminated Chrysler dealerships varies across geographic markets, these dealership closings happened (i.e., treatment occurred) largely in the (short) June -July 2009 time frame across all geographic markets. Note that once a dealership closes, it remains shut -so the treatment e ect on incumbent dealerships is in force from that month on. Hence, much of the exit variation in our setting is cross-sectional (i.e., varies across geographic markets). Moreover, as we discussed in subsection 2.1, the selection criteria for Chrysler closings are dealer-specific characteristics. Our panel data, therefore, allow us to account for strategic selection of the exiting dealer and for other dealer-specific unobservables, via the inclusion of dealer fixed e ects. 13
12 As we discussed earlier, we exclude markets with GM dealer exits. 13 Since the timing of exits is the same (up to being either in June or July) across all treated dealerships, the issue
The next concern is regarding the market where the exit takes place. In certain states, e.g., Connecticut, Georgia, Michigan and New York, state franchise laws (enacted decades before Chrysler's decision to drop dealers) strongly favor automobile dealers at the expense of automobile manufacturers (Smith 1982) . Only under bankruptcy court protection can Chrysler override current state franchise laws, a flexibility not a orded to other non-bankrupt manufacturers. So dealers in certain states (e.g., "monopoly" states) are more likely to face termination than others. 14 Since a dealership can only belong to a particular local geographic market (DMA, e.g., Detroit), our included dealer fixed e ects will also account for these geographic di erences. Third, since our analysis is at the "car" level, di erences in dealer reactions for di erent cars need to be accounted for. For this, we include car (as previously defined) fixed e ects.
Next, given the temporal nature of our data, it is important to control for various trends in prices that might exist (see Kalnins 2004 and Busse et al. 2006 , who discuss the importance of controlling for trends). We include model/month-year (e.g., Toyota Camry/July 2009), and DMA/monthyear (e.g., Detroit/July 2009) fixed e ects in the estimation. Including these fixed e ects helps us control for unobserved factors like manufacturer incentives, advertising, and local gas-price shocks.
For example, demand conditions for cars may change as a result of increasing DMA-level gas prices, which in turn might a ect the pricing policy of the dealers. DMA/month-year fixed e ects also control for di erential trends across markets; this e ect is identified separately from the treatment e ect since there are multiple dealerships in a given geographic area. Further, if one is concerned about trends more local to a dealership area (e.g., prices in certain neighborhoods of Detroit change over time di erentially from other neighborhoods), we control for monthly dealer time trends as well as ZIP-code-level demographics like household income that might change over time (see Table   2 ). 15 Our identifying assumption is that conditional on these controls, dealership closures represent of strategic timing of exits across dealerships is moot; the absence of a time-varying component of the potentially endogenous exit decision obviates the concern of any residual endogeneity and the need for instruments. We address the June versus July exit issue in the robustness checks section of the paper. 14 Model-free evidence does lend support to our ex ante belief about "monopoly" states. Following Smith (1982) ,
we define a monopoly state as a state where the following policies are in place: i) a manufacturer cannot force dealers to accept unordered vehicles, ii) franchises cannot be canceled by manufacturers without cause, and iii) there is a restriction on the entry of new franchises within the exclusive territory of an existing dealer. Only 54% of our dealers who do not face a Chrysler exit are located in monopoly states, as compared to 85% of the dealers who do experience a local market Chrysler exit. 15 We thank K. Sudhir for this suggestion. Note that we cannot include dealer/month-year fixed e ects since that is the level of variation of the treatment in our data.
an exogenous shock to market structure and consequently, dealership exits are orthogonal to any residual unobservables in prices. To allay any further concerns regarding endogeneity, we conduct a "falsification" test; we run our specifications to see whether there is a "treatment" group e ect in a period when there is no closing (i.e., before June 2009). If we were to find a significant impact of this "placebo treatment" on the outcomes of interest, this would suggest that unobservable di erences that are correlated with Chrysler's closings are contributing to our estimated e ects.
To see if both the competitive and agglomeration e ects are at work, we then look at how prices for a given car (or a set of cars) are a ected as the dealership(s) selling that car(s) is (are) located farther away from the exiting Chrysler dealer-within 10 miles, between 10 and 20 miles, and between 20 and 30 miles. The idea behind such a comparison is that agglomeration e ects and competitive e ects change di erentially as one moves farther away from the focal dealership. So a change in relative e ects with distance will be reflected in the prices of the same set of cars across these distance bands. Further, by focusing on the same car (or set of cars) across the di erent distance bands, we alleviate the concern that di erent car brands might have located di erently relative to one another and the Chrysler dealership (within the 30-mile radius) when opening their dealerships. (1)
The Price Model
The coe cient of interest in this specification is -, which represents the average e ect of a one-unit change in Chrysler closings on retail prices. 16 In other words, for a one-dealership increase in the number of closings, we expect to see a 100*[exp(-)-1]% increase in retail price while all other variables in the model are held constant. Note that if -is small (e.g., less than 0.2, which will be the case in our estimations), one can say that a one-unit increase in the number of closings will result in a 100*-% increase in retail price. Dealer fixed e ects ( d ) allow us to control for time-invariant dealer characteristics such as location, size, and chain a liation. In addition, since the number of local competitors is very stable during the span of our data set, dealer fixed e ects e ectively control for local market structure except for the Chrysler closings (i.e., dealer fixed e ects account for 99% of the variation of the number of local competitors excluding exited Chrysler dealers). 17
Limited VIN fixed e ects (
LimV IN ), on the other hand, control for "car"-specific factors such as manufacturer, brand, model, model year, body type, and trim level, among others. Model/monthyear ( model/t ) and DMA/month-year ( DM A/t ) fixed e ects permit us to control for demand conditions (e.g., popularity of the model, gas prices, etc.), and seasonality, as well as month-yearvarying model-or DMA-level marketing activity (for example, manufacturer promotions to dealers and consumers 18 ). We include the number of months since the vehicle was first listed (⁄ 1 ) to take 16 Note that the dummy variables and the interaction of them in a usual di erence-in-di erences specification are subsumed in the various fixed e ects included in Equation 1. Specifically, the treatment dummy in a usual di erencein-di erences specification is controlled for by our dealer fixed e ects, and the after-period dummy is accounted for by our DMA/month-year fixed e ects. The interaction of the treatment dummy and the after-period dummy is captured by our number-of-closings variable. Thus, the coe cient of the number-of-closings variable (-) shows the di erence-in-di erences estimate.
17 Later, we check for robustness to the inclusion of the number of local competitors explicitly in the analysis.
18 Previous literature on manufacturer promotions in the automobile industry suggests that manufacturers usually make dealer and consumer promotion decisions by nameplate, model, and model year (Busse et al. 2006 ). We include model/month-year-level fixed-e ects, which will control for the e ect of promotions and other unobservables, including advertising. We also estimated our main specification using model/model year/month-year fixed e ects instead of model/month-year fixed e ects. The resulting coe cient for the number-of-closings variable did not change.
into account the pressure for the dealer to sell the vehicle. We also include its quadratic term (⁄ 2 )
to be able to capture a possible curvilinear e ect of the number-of-months-since-listed variable on prices. For example, a significant and positive coe cient for the quadratic term will indicate that the e ect of time-since-listed on retail prices is convex.
As we discussed in subsection 2.2.2, there was a di erential change between treatment and control groups in terms of ZIP-code-level median household income between 2008 and 2009. To account for such local time-varying demand factors, we control for ZIP-code-level median household income (' 1 ) and population (' 2 ), which vary annually. Table 3 presents results from eight di erent fixed-e ects specifications where we estimate the e ect of dealer closings on car prices. All eight specifications include dealer, brand, and month-year fixed e ects unless already subsumed by finer fixed e ects. Column (1) provides the results from a specification where we only control for dealer, brand, and month-year fixed e ects. We find that the average e ect of a Chrysler dealer closing is significantly negative (-0.581%, i.e., -$184). However, column (1) also suggests that only 29% of the variation in log prices is explained by the current specification. In other words, one might worry about potential omitted factors that determine the log prices of the cars and that may or may not be correlated with our focal closing variable.
Fixed-E ects Estimation Results
Column (2) presents results from the specification where we control for category-specific factors in addition to the previous controls. The average e ect of a closing is a significant reduction in prices (-0.558%, i.e., -$177). Still, only around 53% of the variation of log prices is accounted for.
Columns (3) through (7) control for additional fixed e ects, including model, DMA/monthyear, model/month-year, and car fixed e ects, as well as the number of months since the vehicle was first listed. The results show that as we control for more factors, the average e ect of closings becomes significantly positive and then stays positive, despite some attenuation of the e ect. The inclusion of DMA/month-year fixed e ects in column (4) changes the closing coe cient from negative to positive (1.43%, i.e., $454). This can be explained by the fact that a possible DMA-level decline in the demand for cars that is omitted in column (3) could lead to a downward bias on the closing coe cient. This might be the case because a decrease in the DMA-level car demand is expected to be positively correlated with competitor closings and negatively correlated with incumbent prices. Therefore, the closing coe cient in column (3) partially reflects the omitted e ect of DMA-level demand shocks. When we further add the time-since-listed variables in our model (specification 5), we find a significant curvilinear e ect of pressure to sell the vehicle (despite a negligible change in the explanatory power of the model). On the other hand, the inclusion of model/month-year (specification 6) and car fixed e ects (specification 7) suggests an upward bias on the closing coe cient. This is expected because model/month-year and car fixed e ects mainly control for month-year-varying model popularity and time-invariant product quality, respectively.
The popularity and quality of a car sold by an incumbent is positively correlated with competitor closings (due to tougher competition) and with price. Thus the omission of these factors will lead to an upward bias on the closing coe cient, as the positive e ect of better incumbent product quality on price will incorrectly be attributed to competitor closings.
Similarly, our final fixed e ect specification shown in column (8) suggests that the omission of ZIP-code-level median household income and population results in an upward bias on the closing coe cient. This is because we observe larger increases in household income and population in ZIP-codes where the treated dealers are located, as we discussed in subsection 2.2.2. Accordingly, when we omit these variables, their potentially positive e ect on prices is attributed to competitor closings. Thus, our final specification shows that, holding other relevant factors constant, incumbent dealers increase their prices, on average, by 1.006% in response to a local Chrysler exit. 19 This average e ect amounts to an increase of $318 for an average car. This final specification explains 97% of the variation in log prices, which leaves little room for any omitted variables. 20
19 We also estimated the specification shown in column (8) using a categorical (instead of continuous) measure for the number-of-closings variable. The percentage of observations for the 4 categories we observe for the number-ofclosings variable is as follows: no exit -89%, 1 exit -9.08%, 2 exits -1.69%, and 3 exits -0.24%. Using the no-exit category as the base category, the coe cients associated with the 3 other category dummies, which are significantly di erent from zero, are: 0.76%, i.e., $241 (1 exit), 2.91%, i.e., $921 (2 exits), and 2.69%, i.e., 851 (3 exits). These results suggest that the marginal e ect of an exit for the 1-exit and 2-exit cases (which collectively represent 98% of the exit observations) are 0.76% ($241) and 1.45% ($460), respectively. As the marginal e ect of 1.006% ($318) based on the continuous measure of the number-of-closings variable summarizes these estimates accurately, the estimation with the categorical closing variable does not improve the model fit despite estimating more parameters. Thus, we proceed with the continuous measure of the number-of-closings variable in the rest of the paper. 20 We also checked whether there is any evidence of endogeneity of the exit-timing decision despite the short period of closings. For the vast majority (87%) of treated dealers, the exits happened either in July, or both in June and July (i.e., some Chrysler dealers exited a local market in June and others exited the same market in July). So we estimated the full specification with all controls using only those markets with June-July (July only) exits and controls. The average closing e ect was found to be 1.22%, i.e., $386 (1.50%, i.e., $474). Thus, there is no substantial evidence of exit-timing endogeneity. We thank Ye im Orhun for this suggestion.
Robustness Checks

Narrow Temporal Windows around Closings
The di erence-in-di erences approach we took in our fixed-e ects estimation uses the prices of cars that are not a ected by dealer closings as the counterfactual prices for cars that are "treated" by dealer exits. In addition, that approach exploits the entire duration of data (October 2008-September 2010) for estimating the average price e ect of closings. Although we include a detailed set of time-varying fixed e ects, one concern with this approach is potential unobservable local market events that might happen in the analysis periods. One way to see if such unobservables could change our previous result, i.e., a modest positive e ect of closings, is to examine the e ects using narrow temporal windows around closings (see Busse et al. 2006 for a similar analysis). 21
The idea behind that approach is that as the analysis window around the focal event gets shorter, the possibility of other events a ecting prices is lower. Accordingly, we analyze only observations within a specific temporal window (e.g., +/-1 month, +/-2 months, etc.) around the closing events.
The underlying assumption here is that the only discontinuous change that a ects prices of the incumbent dealer is the exit of a Chrysler dealership. In addition, analyzing temporally local treatment e ects helps us answer the question of whether our price-reaction results are short-lived.
The e ects of closings across various narrow temporal windows are reported in Table 4 . They show that the e ect of dealer closings on prices is positive and significant for all of the windows we consider. So it is unlikely that an unobserved event was the main reason behind our dealer closings e ect.
Di erential Trends across Dealers
We already included ZIP-code-level median household income and population that vary annually in our main specification to account for local time trends. To further check concerns regarding more granular time trends local to a dealership area (such as the di erent areas of Detroit example that we gave before), we estimate another specification where we include dealer/monthly trend interaction terms to our main specification. Trend interactions are significant for only eight of 21 We thank an anonymous reviewer for his/her suggestion.
our analysis dealers. This indicates that dealer and DMA/month-year fixed e ects already capture much of the variation. Accordingly, we re-run the model with only significant dealer/monthly trend interactions and report the results in column (1) of Table 5 . The results show that the treatment e ect is stable (0.961%, i.e., $304), which is consistent with the fact that 97% of the variation in prices is accounted for using our full fixed e ects specification.
Number of Local Competitors
Another potential issue is that the number of local competitors may confound the estimates. For instance, if Chrysler closed dealerships where the number of local competitors is high and we do not control for its e ect, this could lead to a downward bias on the closing coe cient. This is because we expect that the number of local competitors is negatively correlated with incumbent prices. Since DMAs could span a market area much greater than the 30-mile radius around a focal dealer, our current DMA-month fixed e ects specification does not completely control for the number of local competitors. To see if our results are robust to the inclusion of the number of local car dealerships in a 30-mile radius of a focal dealer, we collected additional monthly data from R.
L. Polk for the census of local competitors. 22 Column (2) in Table 5 reports the results of this robustness check. When we control for the number of local competitors, we find that the main e ect goes up slightly to 1.019%, or $322 (specification 2 in Table 5 ), from 1.006%, or $318 (specification 8 in Table 3 ), showing that the coe cient for the number-of-closings variable is robust. In addition, the coe cient for the number of local competitors is insignificant. This is because (as we stated previously) there is not much temporal variation in this measure. Most of the variation in this measure is cross-sectional and therefore its e ect is already subsumed in the dealer fixed e ects we include in our main specification.
Falsification Exercise
To allay any remaining concerns related to endogeneity, we run a "falsification" test. We estimate our final fixed-e ects specification above to see whether there is a "treatment" group e ect, i.e., placebo e ect, in a period when there is no closing (i.e., before June 2009). To do this, we use all 22 We thank the associate editor for his/her suggestion.
the pre-exit data and divide that into two halves, namely before and after the placebo treatment.
Then we test whether the placebo-closing e ect is significant.
Note that if we were to find a significant impact of the "closing" variable on prices in a period when no closing happens, this would suggest that unobservable di erences that are correlated with
Chrysler closings are contributing to our estimated price e ects. The result from the falsification exercise in Table 5 column (3) shows that the estimate for the placebo-closing variable is insignificant. In other words, the pricing e ects are not driven by the correlation of closing variables with some unobserved shocks that are not controlled for in our final specification. Although in general, one might attribute such a result to the smaller sample size, it is not an issue here because the error degrees of freedom is 131,588. Thus, these results further bolster the argument that the price e ects of closings are true closing e ects.
The falsification test discussed above also tests the existence of di erential trends between treatment and control groups in the pre-treatment period. As a result, the failure to find a significant coe cient for the placebo-closing variable suggests that the preexisting trends are not di erent enough to bias our treatment e ect. We also checked if there are di erential price trends for control and treatment groups by using the pre-treatment period data and testing an interaction term between a monthly time trend and a dummy variable for treated units. We find that the estimated interaction coe cient is very small (0.026% with a p-value of 0.55), supporting the results from the falsification exercise.
Spatial Heterogeneity in Price E ects
The average local market exit e ect we find in Section 3 is considerably smaller than the 10% increase that earlier studies looking at the airline industry have found (Joskow et al. 1994; Daraban and Fournier 2008) . One possible explanation for the small average price increase could be the magnitude of potential externalities among dealers compared to those among airlines. Specifically, since the spatial structure of the auto retail market is di erent from the airline market, the small e ect we find might be a result of averaging among competitors with less spatial di erentiation (those within 10 miles of a closing dealer) and more distant competitors (those within a 20-30-mile distance band from a closing dealer). For example, one could expect that competitors with less spatial di erentiation increase their prices more in response to Chrysler exits than distant competitors. However, if agglomeration benefits erode much faster than gains from spatial spillovers, then we might find the opposite. Accordingly, in this section, we advance empirical evidence that both the "market-power hypothesis" and "agglomeration-benefits hypothesis" are indeed at work in our empirical context. 23 To demonstrate this, we estimate a specification where we count the number of closings within three separate distance bands, namely 0-10 miles, 10-20 miles, and 20-30 miles, representing various levels of spatial di erentiation. 24 If firms co-locate around their more substitutable competitors, then firms that are nearest to the closed dealership are most a ected by the competition e ect. Intuition suggests that firms in the 0-10 miles band are likely to raise prices the most, with the e ect diminishing as we move away from the focal dealership.
On the other hand, if agglomeration benefits erode as a result of an exit, then the dealerships located nearest to the closed dealership su er the most and need to trade o lower prices to compensate for the increased consumer search costs. As we move farther away from the closed dealership, those other dealerships do not benefit from the lower search costs as much in the first place, so they feel less need to keep prices low to attract consumers. In the absence of agglomeration, only the market power hypothesis will be at work.
What we will see in the data at di erent distance bands is the net e ect of the two forces. Since the rates at which these two forces erode (as we move farther away from the closed dealership) could be di erent, the net e ect may not be a monotonic relationship in distance. Specifically, if going from the first band to the second band agglomeration benefits diminish faster than gains from reduced competition and if going from the second band to the third band the opposite happens, then the net e ect will be an inverted-U shaped function of the distance from the closed dealership.
As a result, which pattern exists in our data is an empirical question.
To alleviate the concern noted earlier that di erent cars may be sold in di erent distance bands, we use a subset of our original data set that involves a set of car models that are available across all 23 We also investigated other dimensions of heterogeneity such as closed Chrysler dealership size, car popularity and inventory costs. They indicated small e ects on prices (see Online Appendix 3 for details). 24 Davis (2006) and The results using the same set of cars across the three distance bands are reported in column (1) of Table 6 . We find that, holding other relevant factors constant, the average increase in prices due to a local market exit in the primary distance band (0-10 miles) is 0.85% ($265), in the secondary distance band (10-20 miles) is 3.30% ($1,034), and in the tertiary distance band (20-30 miles) is 2.49% ($780). These findings are in contrast with the intuition that incumbent dealers that are geographically closer to the exiting Chrysler dealers would benefit more from the lower competition due to exits, and as a result increase their prices more than their distant surviving peers. However, our results are consistent with price reactions in an environment where demand-side agglomeration benefits erode via exits. According to this explanation, proximal dealers might have to cut their prices in order to o set lost agglomeration e ciencies. Moreover, the lost agglomeration benefits will a ect proximate dealers the most, which is in line with the smallest price increase for incumbents in the primary distance band. Our results, therefore, reveal a more nuanced e ect of market exits than predicted by either the competition e ect or the agglomeration e ect on its own.
GM Closings
To test the generalizability of our recovered price reaction e ects, we investigate, in this section, the price reactions of surviving dealerships to GM's bankruptcy-protected local-channel exits.
Data
Our data set for the GM analysis includes dealer/VIN-specific monthly retail prices between October 2008 and September 2010. As GM closed its dealerships in a phased-out manner, there is the concern that the timing of the closures may be endogenous. In order to alleviate such endogeneity concerns, we use a subset of GM exits that happened in a relatively short time Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for the key variables used in the estimation as well as the observed car categories in our GM analysis data set. Using data only prior to closures, we ran a regression of log prices on the treatment dummy along with all the observables. The coe cient for the treatment dummy is not significant at the 10% significance level, which suggests that, in the case of GM, too, the treatment and control group dealer prices are similar in the pre-treatment period after controlling for observables.
Results
Main e ect: Table 7 presents results for various fixed-e ects specifications that test the e ect of Pontiac dealer closings on car prices. The final specification (8) replicates our main e ect specification for Chrysler. The estimation for that specification shows that incumbent dealers increase their prices, on average, by 1.472% ($457) in response to a local GM exit. This e ect is slightly larger than that for Chrysler analysis (1.006%, or $318), and it suggests that our main e ect result can be extended to the case of GM exits. Similar to the Chrysler case, the final specification explains around 96% of the variation in log prices. In Table 11 in Online Appendix 3, we report robustness checks regarding di erential trends across dealers and the number of local competitors. These robustness checks show that the exit e ect for Pontiac closings does not change much in response to various additional controls. In addition, the falsification exercise in column (3) indicates that the placebo-closing variable is insignificant.
Spatial heterogeneity in price e ects: For the agglomeration-e ects analysis, we used a sample of our data with a set of car models that we observed across all three distance bands. In addition, we restricted the sample to competing brands for a meaningful comparison with our Chrysler analysis.
The final sample covers 226,147 observations across 48 car models. The estimated coe cients for the agglomeration analysis are shown in column (2) of Table 6 . The coe cients indicate that the average increase in prices due to a local Pontiac exit in the primary distance band (0-10 miles) is 1.23% ($395), in the secondary distance band (10-20 miles) is 1.84% ($591), and in the tertiary distance band (20-30 miles) is 1.39% ($447). Again, we find that the smallest price increase for incumbent dealers is in the nearest distance band. This result further supports the idea that agglomeration e ect is at work, although the relative di erences across bands are smaller in this case than in the Chrysler situation. In summary, our GM analysis results are qualitatively similar to our Chrysler analysis findings.
Conclusion
Firms use local market exits as a strategic way to cope with significant declines in demand, especially in times of economic crisis. Given the prevalence of local market exits, it is useful for policymakers and managers to have a better understanding of the e ect of exits on prices, and on product competition in general. This paper investigates the price e ects of Chrysler's dealer closings in the U.S. auto industry. Using a unique and extensive auto dealer panel data set on new cars that includes monthly observations at the dealer/vehicle level, we provide some empirical evidence on the price e ects of local market exits in a setting with durable goods, high product heterogeneity, and a complex spatial market structure.
We find that retail prices on average increase by 1.006% ($318) following an exit, suggesting that incumbent dealers realize higher pricing power from tempered competition. In order to separate out the competition and agglomeration e ects, we also investigate the spatial heterogeneity of price reactions. We find that agglomeration benefits erode much faster than gains from tempered competition. Accordingly, proximate dealers (within 10 miles) have an even lower ability to raise prices than extremely distant (20-30 miles) firms ($265 versus $780). This result supports consumers' search costs motivation for store clustering put forth by previous agglomeration studies (Marshall 1920; Stahl 1982; Wernerfelt 1994) . Our GM analysis suggests that the Chrysler closing results are qualitatively generalizable to other firm exits. Collectively, our results inform consumers, firms, and policymakers about possible implications of a firm exit regarding changes in the market power of incumbent firms and heterogeneous spatial outcomes.
Although this study makes several contributions to the empirical literature on market exits and distribution channels, it has several limitations. Consistent with the vast majority of the extant studies on competitive reactions, this study, too, investigates the impact of exits on one aspect of the marketing mix, i.e., retailer pricing. Expanding the investigation to other elements of the marketing mix will nicely augment the current study. Our distance-bands analysis shows that the relationship between the distance from the exiting dealership and price increases due to exits follows an inverted-U shape. Although this finding indirectly suggests that the inverted-U pattern emerges as a result of two countervailing forces (i.e., competition and agglomeration), we do not model these forces explicitly. Our analysis is limited by our data, which contain dealer-vehicle-specific retail prices. By focusing on these prices, we are able to study the incumbent dealers' reactions across their entire inventory. Understanding how dealers' reactions to Chrysler exits manifest in transacted prices is another valuable direction of future research inquiry. However, this will come at the expense of studying price reactions only on a subset of the dealer inventory. Our results are based on the exits of two firms in a single industry critical to the success of the U.S. economy.
Future research can investigate and contrast similar large-scale distribution channel changes in other industry settings. In the current study, our distribution channel exits are rooted in the financial distress of the upstream manufacturer. We also hope that future research will investigate whether and how incumbent retailers di erentially respond to market structure changes induced by the financial distress of the upstream manufacturer versus the financial woes of the downstream competing retailer. ZIP-code-level population n/a n/a n/a 0. 
Online Appendix 1: Additional Tables and Figures
In this appendix, we provide the additional figures and tables mentioned in the paper. Note that the total number of observations used for generating the density graphs is as follows: Ford -644 (48 for the treatment group with 1 closing and 12 for the treatment group with 2 closings); Toyota -265 (29 for the treatment group with 1 closing and 15 for the treatment group with 2 closings); Honda -62 (24 for the treatment group with 1 closing.). 
Online Appendix 2: Graphical Analysis of Retail Prices
In this appendix, we present some preliminary graphical analyses that give us a rough idea of the impact of market exits on prices. More precisely, we create density plots of the di erence in real prices 25 before and after dealer closings of a particular car model for dealerships in the treatment and control groups. The idea here is to see whether there is any di erential change in market prices between the a ected and una ected dealers. For instance, if the density plot for the control group is centered around zero and that for the treatment group is centered around a di erent value, this would imply that dealer closings could have an e ect on market prices. Of course, this implication is based on the assumption that control group dealers can credibly serve as controls for treatment dealers. In subsection 2.2.2, we mentioned that the treatment and control group dealerships are comparable in terms of many market-related observables such as population and average household size in the period before Chrysler exits. In order to further check the appropriateness of our control group dealers, we also plot average price distributions for treatment and control group dealers in a period before closings (i.e., January 2009). However, for Toyota Tundra, the plots showing the di erence in real prices before and after closings indicate that treatment group dealers cut their prices more than control group dealers after the closings. In contrast, for Ford Ranger, treatment group dealers raised their prices more than control group dealers after the closings. In our empirical analysis, we are interested in the average of these di erential changes across all 119 car models. As a result, the direction of the average e ect and the di erences in this e ect for di erent sets of cars and distances are empirical questions. Note that the before-after price di erences are calculated for each dealer/model combination separately, meaning that dealer-and model-level time-invariant factors are already controlled for in these graphs. On 25 We use the Consumer Price Index to convert prices to January 2008 prices for the graphical analysis. In the sections where we estimate formal models, the natural logarithm of nominal prices is used as the dependent variable, and we include month-year fixed e ects to use only within-month variation in prices.
26 Some treated dealers in our data face more than one Chrysler exit. A graphical comparison of the pre-exit price distributions for di erent number of exits is provided in Online Appendix 1. The graphs suggest that the pre-exit price distributions are similar for di erent number of closings.
the other hand, price di erence plots for the two models suggest that there might be model-level time-varying factors that we should take into account, because control group means are positive and they are not centered around zero. Therefore, we should assess the di erence in the treatment group using a before-and-after-with-control group (i.e., di erence-in-di erences) approach.
Since the number of treatment group observations in the model-level density plots is limited, we pool the observations for the same brand to see whether di erential price changes remain between the a ected and control dealers. The patterns become less clear for certain brands such as Ford (see Figure 6 ). Although the above graphical analyses provide some preliminary evidence that there is a di erential movement in prices for the dealers of rival brands that are in the same local markets with closed Chrysler dealers, many confounding factors could a ect such a movement. Further, separating out agglomeration and competition e ects is challenging with such an analysis. In order to be able to control for various confounding factors while measuring the e ect of local market exits, we consider a formal empirical specification in Section 3. Note that the total number of observations used for generating the di erence density graphs is as follows: Ford Ranger -42 (4 for the treatment group); Toyota Tundra -15 (3 for the treatment group). The following steps were employed in creating the price di erence density plots: First, for each dealer/model combination in the data set we calculate average prices (across VINs) one month before and one month after the closings. Second, for each dealer/model combination, we compute the di erence between these averages. Third, we create kernel density plots for the focal model (e.g., Ford Ranger) separately for treatment and control group dealers. Note that the total number of dealer/model observations used for generating the di erence density graphs is 574 for Ford (64 for the treatment group), 197 for Toyota (39 for the treatment group), and 89 for Honda (33 for the treatment group).
Online Appendix 3: Additional Robustness
Other Dimensions of Heterogeneity: Closed Chrysler Dealership Size, Car Pop-
ularity, and Inventory Costs
We also examined heterogeneous price e ects based on the size of the Chrysler dealership closing as well as the popularity of the car model that is a ected by Chrysler closings. More precisely, the size of the closed Chrysler dealership, measured by the average monthly sales before the closing, captures the value of the abandoned market for incumbents. For example, the increase in incumbent prices due to exit could be higher if the closed Chrysler dealership had a larger market (e.g., Gatignon et al. 1989) . Similarly, the increase in incumbent prices could depend on the popularity of the car model, measured by the average monthly sales rank in the pre-closings period. Such heterogeneity might exist, for instance, if incumbents use Chrysler dealer closings as an opportunity to de-emphasize relatively unpopular car models. Our results related to these other dimensions of heterogeneity indicated small e ects on prices.
In addition, we assessed the impact of a potential reduction in inventory costs for incumbents as a result of Chrysler exits. We visually inspected the plots of the average number of months to sell a vehicle by dealer for treatment and control group dealers. The plots (see below) do not suggest a di erential change between the selling spells between the treatment and control group dealers. We also formally tested this by regressing the average number of months to sell a vehicle by dealer on the treatment dummy, an after-period dummy indicating the periods following an exit and the interaction of the two. The coe cient estimates (standard errors) for these three variables are -0.360 (0.307), -0.659 (0.157), and 0.043 (0.401), respectively. These results suggest that the interaction coe cient is insignificant at the 10% level. Hence, we conclude that a reduction in inventory costs does not change our results. In summary, our core results are robust. 
